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INTRODUCTION
The death penalty is a controversial issue with extensive roots in
American history.1 Some believe it should continue to be used as an
effective tool for punishment,2 while others consider it to be an unjust
form of punishment that does little to actually deter murderers.3 Many
predict that the death penalty may soon be abolished, including the late
United States Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia.4 However,
because the Supreme Court declined to find the death penalty
unconstitutional in a recent Supreme Court case,5 issues surrounding
the constitutionality of the implementation of this type of punishment
remain both relevant and necessary to continue to explore.
While there are many potential constitutional issues in connection
with death penalty sentences, this comment analyzes the Sixth
Amendment of the Constitution.6
First, a brief history of the death penalty will be examined.7 Next,
both the Sixth Amendment in connection with the death penalty as well
as case law pertaining to accomplice and felony murder liability
involving the death penalty will be addressed.8 This section will begin
by assessing how much protection the Sixth Amendment provides to
defendants concerning their right to a jury trial by examining a range of
1. See Sheherezade C. Malik & D. Paul Holdsworth, A Survey of the History of the
Death Penalty in the United States, 49 U. RICH. L. REV. 693, 693–94 (2015).
2. See Symposium, Be Careful What You Ask For: Lessons From New York’s Recent
Experience With Capital Punishment, 32 VT. L. REV. 683, 689–91 (2008) (explaining
different reasons behind supporting the death penalty, including what two scholars view as
“the most important” contemporary justification: the retribution theory—“‘those who
commit the most premeditated or heinous murders should be executed simply on the
grounds that they deserve it’”).
3. See John D. Bessler, Revisiting Beccaria’s Vision: The Enlightenment, America’s
Death Penalty, and the Abolition Movement, 4 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 195, 312–26 (2009).
This article argues that the death penalty will soon be abolished. It claims that the death
penalty does not deter murderers and cites studies that show no causal relationship between
death sentences and murder rates. “The death penalty saps the resources of America’s
criminal justice system, and at bottom, death sentences are only corrosive of our efforts to
build a more just and less violent society.”
4. Martin Kaste, Justice Scalia: ‘Wouldn’t Surprise Me’ If Supreme Court Strikes
Down Death Penalty, NPR LAW, www.npr.org/2015/10/21/450611707/justice-scaliawouldnt-surprise-me-if-supreme-court-strikes-down-death-penalty (last visited December
20, 2015) (stating that Justice Antonin Scalia said “that he would not be surprised if the
Supreme Court strikes down the death penalty”); see also Bessler, supra note 3, at 312–26
(arguing that the death penalty will soon be abolished).
5. See Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2739 (2015) (“[W]e have time and again
reaffirmed that capital punishment is not per se unconstitutional . . . we decline to
effectively overrule these decisions.”).
6. U.S. Const. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a . . . trial, by an impartial jury . . . .”).
7. See infra Part IA.
8. See infra Part IB.
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relevant case law and how this right has expanded over the years. This
section will then discuss the case law on accomplice and felony murder
liability; specifically, when defendants convicted under these laws may
be sentenced to death.
Next, the legal problem will be addressed: specifically, the lack of
case law on whether an individual who did not commit the underlying
murder is entitled to have a jury determine aggravating and mitigating
factors when assessing whether or not the death penalty should be
implemented.
Ring v. Arizona and Tison v. Arizona will then be analyzed in
depth.9 Ring provides the recent and current approach to Sixth
Amendment claims implicating the right to a jury trial brought by
defendants who were sentenced to death for committing murder. Tison
addresses when it is constitutional under the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments to sentence an accomplice or someone involved in felony
murder to death.
Finally, in light of analyzing these two cases, this Comment
argues that the holding in Ring should extend to Tison cases.10 In other
words, accomplices and felony murder participants who face the death
penalty should be entitled to the same Sixth Amendment protections as
convicted murderers are per Ring. Therefore, juries and not judges
must assess aggravating and mitigating factors when there is a finding
of fact that increases a defendant’s maximum punishment regardless of
whether or not they were the actual murderer.
I.

BACKGROUND

A. History of Death Penalty
The death penalty has been utilized as a legitimate form of
punishment in the United States since the country’s formation.11 In
assessing the constitutionality of the death penalty, it has been argued
that the text of the Constitution’s Fifth Amendment demonstrates the
founders’ acceptance of the death penalty.12 The Fifth Amendment
states: “No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law . . .”13 This Amendment has been construed
to imply that “the framers of the Constitution understood and agreed

9. See infra Part III.
10. See infra Part IV.
11. See Malik & Holdsworth, supra note 1, at 695 (“For better or worse, the death
penalty was a staple of criminal justice in early America; it was both widely accepted and
largely uncontroversial.”).
12. See id.
13. US Const. amend. V.
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that life could be constitutionally taken assuming there was due process
of law.”14
The death penalty was originally used as a form of punishment for
a range of crimes, including murder, witchcraft, or practicing
Quakerism.15 After this initial widespread use, America began using
the death penalty for serious crimes exclusively.16 There were also
movements during the mid- to late 1800s to abolish the death penalty,
but no significant traction was made.17 There was another movement
during the 1950s and 1960s, and the use of the death penalty continued
to decrease.18 Although some states have chosen to abolish the death
penalty as a form of punishment, it remains a constitutionally
permissible sentence to employ if the states or federal government
choose to use it.
B. Modern Elaboration on Constitutionality of the Death Penalty
In 1972, the Supreme Court found that a state’s death penalty that
gave virtually complete discretion to the jury in implementing the death
penalty violated the Eighth Amendment as cruel and unusual
punishment.19 While this case could have marked the end of the death
penalty, in a subsequent case, the Court upheld versions of states’ death
penalty laws that granted juries some discretion in applying the death
penalty;20 in other words, state laws that gave total discretion to juries
as well as state laws that gave juries no discretion in imposing the
death penalty were unconstitutional.21 In order for a state law to be
constitutional, it must satisfy the Court’s criteria.
The Court tolerates states’ experimentation with the death penalty,
provided that states (1) give juries some criteria—usually in the
form of aggravating factors—to determine whether the defendant is
eligible for the death penalty, and (2) allow juries the opportunity

14. See Malik & Holdsworth, supra note 1, at 695 (“The Fifth Amendment states, ‘No
person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property’ although with the very important
caveat, ‘without due process of law.’ In other words, the framers of the Constitution
understood and agreed that life could be constitutionally taken assuming there was due
process of law.”).
15. Id. at 695.
16. See id. at 696 (“Many states reduced the list of capital offenses to murder, rape, or
treason.”).
17. See, id. at 697–99; see also, Lyn Suzanne Entzeroth, The End of the Beginning: The
Politics of Death and the American Death Penalty Regime in the Twenty-First Century, 90
OR. L. REV. 797, 802–03 (2012) (explaining that several states abolished the death penalty
from the 1840s to the early 1900s, but some went on to reinstate it).
18. See Entzeroth, supra note 18, at 803.
19. See id. at 804 (describing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972)).
20. See id. at 807 (describing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976)).
21. Id. at 807–08.
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to consider mitigating evidence and perform individualized
22
sentencing to impose a sentence less than death, if warranted.

Since this modern elaboration on crafting death penalty laws, the
Supreme Court has imposed some additional restrictions. For example,
“in 2002 and 2005, the Court restricted the states’ prerogatives in
structuring their capital sentencing regimes by forbidding the
imposition of the death penalty on mentally retarded offenders and
juvenile offenders.”23 The Court has also held that “the death penalty
is an excessive punishment for ordinary crimes in which the victim is
not murdered,” including raping a child.24
C. Constitutional Issues Surrounding the Imposition of the Death
Penalty:
1. Death Penalty and the Sixth Amendment
Over the years there have been constitutional challenges to
various death penalty laws claiming violations of the Sixth
Amendment. Among other things, the Sixth Amendment guarantees
that a defendant will be tried before an impartial jury in criminal
cases.25 However, the determination of what the right to a jury trial
means has evolved over the years. The following cases illustrate an
expansion in terms of the scope of a defendant’s Sixth Amendment
right: initially the right was interpreted to allow for judicial override of
jury determinations but over time the right has expanded to require a
jury to make any findings that increase the statutory maximum
punishment, including aggravating factors.26
Spaziano v. Florida
In Spaziano v. Florida,27 the Supreme Court held that it did not
violate the Sixth Amendment when a judge overrode the jury’s
sentence in imposing the death penalty.28 In Spaziano, the defendant
22. Id. at 809 (referencing Gregg, 428 U.S. at 153).
23. Id. at 815 (referencing Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319–21 (2002) in regards
to the mentally retarded death penalty limitation and Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578–
79 (2005) in regards to the juvenile death penalty limitation).
24. See Entzeroth, supra note 18, at 815–16 (explaining the holding in Kennedy v.
Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 420-21 (2008)).
25. US Const. Amend. VI.
26. See Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 648 (1990) (quoting Poland v. Arizona, 476
U.S. 147 (1986)) (“Aggravating circumstances are not separate penalties or offenses, but are
‘standards to guide the making of [the] choice’ between the alternative verdicts of death and
life imprisonment.”).
27. Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984).
28. Id. at 465–66 (“The advice does not become a judgment simply because it comes
from the jury.”).
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was found guilty of first-degree murder and the jury recommended the
defendant serve life in prison.29 Based on Florida’s state laws, the
judge conducted his own assessment of the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances, overrode the jury’s sentence, and imposed the death
penalty.30
The Supreme Court upheld the judge’s conviction holding that:
“Regardless of the jury’s recommendation, the trial judge is required to
conduct an independent review of the evidence and to make his own
findings regarding aggravating and mitigating circumstances.”31 They
concluded that as long as the judge’s override was not based on an
arbitrary or discriminatory imposition of the death penalty, it was
valid.32
Walton v. Arizona
Similarly, in Walton v. Arizona,33 the Supreme Court upheld a
judge’s imposition of the death penalty after he found the requisite
aggravating factors.34 In his appeal, the defendant claimed that this
decision was unconstitutional because a judge and not a jury imposed
the death penalty.35 In explaining their decision, the Court relied on
Cabana v. Bullock,36 which held that the Sixth Amendment does not
provide “a defendant with the right to have a jury consider the
appropriateness of a capital sentence.”37 They went on to state that
determining “whether a defendant’s constitutional rights have been
violated, has long been viewed as one that a trial judge or an appellate
court is fully competent to make.”38 In Walton, the Court also
emphasized the difference between finding “elements of an offense”
and sentencing “considerations.”39 They argued that balancing
aggravating and mitigating factors are different because they do not

29. Id. at 451.
30. Id.at 451–52.
31. Id. at 466.
32. Id.
33. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990).
34. Id. at 647.
35. Id.
36. Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376 (1986).
37. Id. at 385–86.
38. Id. at 386.
39. Walton, 497 U.S. at 648 (quoting Poland v. Arizona, 476 U.S. 147 (1986))
(“Aggravating circumstances are not separate penalties or offenses, but are ‘standards to
guide the making of [the] choice’ between the alternative verdicts of death and life
imprisonment. Thus, under Arizona’s capital sentencing scheme, the judge’s finding of any
particular aggravating circumstance does not of itself ‘convict’ a defendant (i.e., require the
death penalty), and the failure to find any particular aggravating circumstance does not
‘acquit’ a defendant (i.e., preclude the death penalty).”).
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involve elements of the crime itself.40 In other words, determining a
convicted individual’s sentence is not protected under the Sixth
Amendment and can be done solely by a judge.
The Court reiterated their rationale from Spaziano, as well as
many other cases, in holding that it did not violate the Sixth
Amendment for a judge to impose a death penalty sentence: “Any
argument that the Constitution requires that a jury impose the sentence
of death or make the findings prerequisite to imposition of such a
sentence has been soundly rejected by prior decisions of this Court.”41
Apprendi v. New Jersey
Although not involving the death penalty, in Apprendi v. New
Jersey,42 the Supreme Court made a decision regarding the jury’s role
in criminal cases that appeared to contradict Walton: “Other than the
fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury,
and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”43 The Court went on to
explain that this finding did not invalidate Walton, but instead is
distinguishable because in Walton the jury already declared the
defendant guilty of murder, a crime that “carries as its maximum
penalty the sentence of death.”44
However, the dissent in Apprendi argued that the majority’s
decision effectively overruled Walton: “If the Court does not intend to
overrule Walton, one would be hard pressed to tell from the opinion it
issues today.”45 In other words, the dissent argued that because the
majority held that a jury needed to decide any fact that increased the
statutory maximum sentence, if a jury imposed a sentence of life in
prison based on their findings of fact and a judge then overrode this
sentence and imposed death, he or she is making a factual decision that
an aggravating factor exists and there is a lack of sufficient mitigating
factors, which, in effect, increases the maximum sentence to death.46
This scenario would be unconstitutional under Apprendi but was
upheld in Walton.

40. See id.
41. Id. at 647–48 (citing Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 745 (1990)).
42. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
43. Id. at 490.
44. Id. at 496–97 (citing Justice Scalia’s dissent in Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at
257, n. 2 and Justice Thomas’ concurrence in Jones, 526 U.S. at 250–51).
45. Id. at 538.
46. See id.
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2. Modern Interpretation of Death Penalty and Sixth
Amendment:
Ring v. Arizona
The Supreme Court needed to address the seemingly contradictory
holdings in the wake of the Walton and Apprendi decisions. They
chose to tackle this conflict in Ring v. Arizona.47 In Ring, the jury
found the defendant guilty of felony murder due to his apparent
involvement with a murder that occurred during the course of a
robbery.48 Based on Arizona law involving first-degree murder, in
order for Ring to be sentenced to death the court had to make further
findings.49
Under Arizona law, the judge who presided at trial conducts a
sentencing hearing and the judge could only sentence Ring to death if
he found at least one aggravating circumstance and no sufficient
mitigating circumstances.50 At the sentencing hearing, one of Ring’s
co-defendants testified that Ring had been the leader and was the one
who actually shot the victim.51 The judge entered a “Special Verdict”
sentencing Ring to death based on the finding that Ring was the actual
killer, and he also found that Ring was a major participant in the
robbery and armed robbery “is unquestionably a crime that carries with
it a grave risk of death.”52
The judge also found two aggravating factors associated with
Ring’s offense.53 First, Ring “committed the offense in expectation of
receiving something of ‘pecuniary value,’”54 and second, the crime was
committed “in an especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner.”55
The judge found one mitigating factor that was not in the statute,
Ring’s “minimal criminal record.”56 However, he found that this factor
47. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
48. Id. at 591.
49. Id. at 592.
50. Id. at 592–93.
51. Id. at 593.
52. Id. at 594 (citing the holding from Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982)
that the Eighth Amendment requires finding that defendants convicted of felony murder
killed or attempted to kill and the holding from Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 158 (1987)
that qualifies Enmund by saying the Eighth Amendment allows for the execution of a
felony-murder defendant “who did not kill or attempt to kill, but who was a ‘major
participa[nt] in the felony committed’ and who demonstrated ‘reckless indifference to
human life’”).
53. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 594 (2002).
54. Id. at 594–95. Specifically, the judge found that “[t]aking the cash from the
armored car was the motive and reason for Mr. Magoch’s murder and not just the result.”
55. Id. at 595. “In support of this finding, he cited Ring’s comment, as reported by
Greenham at the sentencing hearing, expressing pride in his marksmanship.”
56. Id.
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did not “call for leniency,” and Ring was sentenced to death.57
Ring appealed his sentence and one of his arguments was that
Arizona’s sentencing requirements violate the Sixth Amendment
because “it entrusts to a judge the finding of a fact raising the
defendant’s maximum penalty.”58
After granting review, the Supreme Court began its opinion by
explaining the Arizona Supreme Court’s opinion. That court agreed
with the dissent in Apprendi, but at the same time Walton bound them,
as it had not been overruled:59 “[i]t therefore rejected Ring’s
constitutional attack on the State’s capital murder judicial sentencing
system.”60 Ring also challenged the validity of the assessment of the
aggravating and mitigating factors.61 The Arizona Supreme Court
agreed that the depravity factor had not been proven, but upheld the
pecuniary gain as an aggravating factor and affirmed the death penalty
sentence.62
The issue that the Supreme Court had to address in Ring was
whether, under the Sixth Amendment applicable to the states through
the Fourteenth Amendment, a judge rather than a jury could find an
aggravating factor that increased the statutory maximum penalty a
defendant faced.63
The Supreme Court summarized much of the case law on the topic
of a defendant’s right to a jury trial under the Sixth Amendment and
ultimately concluded that Walton, in relevant part, cannot survive
Apprendi.64 The Court explained Ring was exposed to a more severe
sentence—death—based on the judge’s finding of an aggravating
circumstance, and this contradicts Apprendi.65 They also concluded
that attempting to distinguish “sentencing factors” from “elements of
an offense” is ineffective because Apprendi holds that it is the effect of
the finding that matters, not the label it is given.66 The pertinent
question is whether the finding at issue increases the statutory
maximum punishment; if it does, then the finding must be made by a
jury to be constitutional.67
The Court also explained that the fact that the death penalty is at

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id.
Id. at 595.
Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 596 (2002).
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 597.
Id. at 603.
Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 604 (2002).
Id. at 604–06.
See id. at 604–05.
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issue does not mean that the rules are different regarding a defendant’s
constitutional rights.68 Determinations about aggravating factors must
be left to a jury rather than a judge in all criminal cases where the
defendant elects to have a jury as the finder of fact because this finding
has severe ramifications for the defendant’s sentence; in Arizona’s
statute, it was literally the difference between life and death.
The Court also dismissed Arizona’s assertion that judicial findings
of fact regarding aggravating factors are more accurate and should
therefore be utilized for this purpose.69
The Court concluded their opinion by overruling “Walton to the
extent that it allows a sentencing judge, sitting without a jury, to find
an aggravating circumstance necessary for imposition of the death
penalty.”70 This is due to the fact that in this case, aggravating factors
serve as “the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense,’
the Sixth Amendment requires that they be found by a jury.”71 This
holding established the expansion of a convicted murderer’s Sixth
Amendment right,72 but left open the question of whether this
expansion extends to individuals who face the death penalty due to
their role in the offense—without having committed the underlying
murder.
3. Vicarious Liability and Constitutional Challenges to Death
Penalty Sentences
Most of the individuals who have been executed under death
penalty laws were found guilty of committing the underlying murder at
issue.73 Other than the actual killer, another group of individuals who

68. See id. at 606–07.
69. Id. at 607–09. The Court explained that “‘[t]he founders of the American Republic
were not prepared to leave it to the State, which is why the jury-trial guarantee was one of
the least controversial provisions of the Bill of Rights. It has never been efficient; but it has
always been free.’” (citing Justice Scalia’s concurrence in Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 498). The
Court also argued that it is not evident that a judge’s assessment is more reliable than a
jury’s, and that many other states leave the finding of aggravating factors to juries.
70. Id. at 609.
71. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002) (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494, n.
19).
72. Alabama remains the only state to permit a judge to override a jury’s life verdict
and impose the death penalty. Kent Faulk, In Alabama, You Can Be Sentenced to Death
Even if Jurors Don’t Agree, THE MARSHALL PROJECT: NONPROFIT JOURNALISM ABOUT
CRIMINAL
JUSTICE
(Dec.
7,
2016,
7:00
AM),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2016/12/07/in-alabama-you-can-be-sentenced-to-deatheven-if-jurors-don-t-agree#.DKxCTfoVi; see also The Death Penalty in Alabama: Judge
Override: Executive Summary and Major Findings, EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE,
http://eji.org/reports/death-penalty-alabama-judge-override.
73. Those Executed Who did not Directly Kill the Victim, DEATH PENALTY
INFORMATION CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/those-executed-who-did-not-
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may be eligible for the death penalty include individuals accused of
felony murder, or individuals who “participated in a felony during
which a victim died at the hands of another participant in the felony.”74
Many states have such felony murder laws or variations thereof and
have carried out executions based on these convictions.75 Defendants
convicted of felony murder have successfully challenged their
convictions under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.76 Some
examples of such cases are described below.
Lockett v. Ohio
In Lockett,77 the defendant was convicted of aggravated murder
and sentenced to death under an Ohio statute after she waited in the
getaway car while a robbery-murder took place.78 The Supreme Court
reversed the defendant’s death sentence, holding that Ohio’s death
penalty statute violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment’s
protections against cruel and unusual punishment because it did not
allow the sentencer to consider certain mitigating factors.79 In their
decision, the Court made clear that it remains constitutional for states
to impose the death penalty against aiders and abettors or accomplices:
“States have authority to make aiders and abettors equally responsible,
as a matter of law, with principals, or to enact felony-murder statutes is
beyond constitutional challenge.”80
Enmund v. Florida
Later, in Enmund,81 the Court examined whether the death penalty
could be imposed on a defendant, Enmund, who did not take or attempt
to take life.82 The defendant at issue was waiting in the getaway car
while two others shot and killed two individuals during the course of a
robbery.83 Enmund was convicted of first-degree murder and robbery

directly-kill-victim.
74. Id.
75. Id. States that have executed defendants convicted of felony murder include Texas,
Florida, Utah, Indiana, Oklahoma, and Missouri.
76. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978); see also Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S.
782 (1982).
77. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 586.
78. Id. at 589-91.
79. Id. at 604–06. Specifically, the Ohio statute at issue did not allow the sentencer to
consider the character and record of the individual and the circumstances of the offense. In
Lockett, the Court held that these mitigating factors were constitutionally required to be
considered in most capital cases.
80. See id. at 602.
81. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 782.
82. Id. at 787.
83. Id. at 784–86.
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under a Florida felony murder statute which held aiders and abettors
liable for any murder that took place during the course of a robbery or
attempted robbery.84 He was sentenced to death based on the finding of
various aggravating factors and no mitigating factors.85
The Supreme Court of the United States reversed Florida’s
Supreme Court verdict and held that imposing the death penalty on a
defendant who “neither took life, attempted to take life, nor intended to
take life . . . is inconsistent with the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments.”86 In coming to this decision, the Court took a number
of factors into consideration.
First, the Court looked at various state laws concerning when the
death penalty is imposed against a defendant for “participation in a
robbery in which another robber takes life.”87 The Court went through
every states’ approach and found that: “only a small minority of
jurisdictions—eight—allow the death penalty to be imposed solely
because the defendant somehow participated in a robbery in the course
of which a murder was committed.”88 The Court concluded, in regard
to this factor, that because the majority of states would not authorize
the death penalty in a case like Enmund, it weighed in favor of
“rejecting capital punishment for the crime at issue.”89
The Court also found support for rejecting Enmund’s sentence
based on society’s apparent rejection of felony murder liability for
individuals who did not themselves kill, based on jury sentencing
statistics.90
The Court concluded that because there was no indication that
Enmund intended to kill, or for anyone to be killed, his actions did not
merit the death penalty and he should have been treated differently than
his co-defendants who actually committed murder.91
Tison v. Arizona
In Tison,92 the Supreme Court was tasked with determining
whether two defendants’ death penalty sentences violated the Eighth
84. Id. at 785.
85. Id. The aggravating factors that Florida’s Supreme Court found included the fact
that Enmund was an “accomplice in the commission of an armed robbery” and that Enmund
was “previously convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence.”
86. Id. at 787–88.
87. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 789–92 (1982).
88. Id. at 792.
89. Id. at 793.
90. Id. at 794. The Court relied on the results of a survey to support their conclusion:
“The survey revealed only 6 cases out of 362 where a nontriggerman felony murderer was
executed.”
91. Id. at 798.
92. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987).
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Amendment.93 The primary issue was whether they possessed the
requisite intent, because they were involved with a felony murder but
neither of them intended to kill the victim nor actually pulled the
triggers.94
The defendants, two brothers, along with a third brother, helped
their father Gary Tison and his cellmate escape prison by bringing a
chest full of guns into the prison they were housed at.95 Both men were
convicted murderers.96 While on the run, the two convicts along with
the three Tison boys carjacked a family, and Gary Tison and his
cellmate shot and killed the family.97
The police eventually located the Tison boys, their father, and his
cellmate, but during the course of their apprehension one Tison son
was killed and their father escaped into the desert, where he
subsequently died.98 The two remaining Tison boys, Raymond and
Ricky, along with their father’s cellmate, were then tried for their
various crimes.99 Among their charges, each defendant was tried for
four counts of capital murder based on Arizona’s felony murder and
accomplice liability laws.100 Each defendant was convicted under these
laws.101
Under Arizona law, in capital cases a judge conducts a sentencing
proceeding to determine “whether the crime was sufficiently
aggravated to warrant the death sentence.”102 The judge found three
aggravating factors and no statutory mitigating factors.103
The judge found that the defendant’s participation “in the crimes
giving rise to the application of the felony murder rule was very
substantial.”104 The trial judge also found that each defendant “could
reasonably have foreseen that his conduct . . . would cause or create a
93. Id. at 138.
94. See id.
95. Id. at 139.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 139–41.
98. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 141 (1987).
99. Id.
100. Id. Arizona’s felony murder law was as follows: “providing that a killing occurring
during the perpetration of robbery or kidnapping is capital murder.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
13-452 (1956) (repealed 1978). Arizona’s accomplice liability law stated “that each
participant in the kidnaping or robbery is legally responsible for the acts of his
accomplices.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-139 (1956) (repealed 1978).
101. Id. at 141–42.
102. Id. at 142 (citing Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-454(A) (Supp. 1973) (repealed 1978)).
103. Id. at 142. The three aggravating factors that the judge found included that “the
Tisons had created a grave risk of death to others (not the victims); the murders had been
committed for pecuniary gain; the murders were especially heinous.”
104. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 142 (1987) (citing Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13454(F)(3) (Supp. 1973) (repealed 1978)).
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grave risk of . . . death.”105
The judge also found numerous non-statutory mitigating factors,
including: “the petitioners’ youth—Ricky was 20 and Raymond was
19; neither had prior felony records; each had been convicted of the
murders under the felony murder rule.”106 However, the defendants
were sentenced to death.107 The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the
brothers’ sentences;108 they reached this conclusion based on the
following rationale:
The record establishes that both Ricky and Raymond Tison were
present when the homicides took place and that they occurred as
part of and in the course of the escape and continuous attempt to
prevent recapture. The deaths would not have occurred but for
their assistance. That they did not specifically intend that the
Lyonses and Theresa Tyson die, that they did not plot in advance
that these homicides would take place, or that they did not actually
pull the triggers on the guns which inflicted the fatal wounds is of
109
little significance.

In evaluating the trial court’s findings, the Arizona Supreme Court
upheld the pecuniary gain and heinousness aggravating factors as well
as the death sentences.110 The United States Supreme Court denied the
Tisons’ petition for certiorari.111
Enmund was decided in the interim, which held that in order to
impose the death penalty on a defendant accused of felony murder, it
must be proven that the defendant intended to kill.112 In light of
Enmund, the Tisons’ again appealed their case to the Arizona Supreme
Court.113 In each brother’s case, the Arizona Supreme Court found that
there was evidence beyond a reasonable doubt demonstrating both
brothers’ intent to kill.114
In Raymond Tison’s appeal, the court relied on various incidents
that took place during the prison breakout and during the incidents
leading up to and after the murders.115 During the breakout, the court
found that because Raymond assisted with his father’s breakout, which
included holding a gun to prison guards, knew that his father was
105. Id. (citing Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-454(F)(4) (Supp. 1973) (repealed 1978)).
106. Id. at 142–43.
107. Id. at 143.
108. Id.
109. See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 143 (1987) (citing State v. (Ricky Wayne)
Tison, 129 Ariz. 526, 545 (1981)).
110. Id. at 143.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 143–44.
113. See id.
114. Id. at 143–46.
115. See Tison, v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 143–45 (1987).
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serving a life sentence for murder, and later told police that he would
have killed in a “very close life or death situation,”116 these facts
showed that Raymond “could anticipate the use of lethal force” during
the breakout.117
The court also found that he possessed the requisite intent during
the carjacking and murders.118 The facts that he provided the murder
weapons, actively participated in the carjacking, and watched as four
people were murdered and did nothing, all showed the court that he
intended to kill.119 The court distinguished the Tison cases from
Enmund because in Enmund, the defendant was not at the location
where the victims were killed and he did not “actively participate in the
events leading to death.”120 The court applied a similar rationale in
finding that Ricky Tison also possessed the necessary intent and denied
his appeal as well.121
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine if the Arizona
Supreme Court correctly applied Enmund.122 The Court first went
through the facts of Enmund.123 Next, it turned to the rationale the
Court employed in Enmund, which included examining various states’
laws as well as juries’ views on liability for felony murder and
assessing how the law in question compared to the majority of states’
approaches.124 This allowed it to come to the conclusion that being
convicted of felony murder was not enough to sentence a defendant to
the death penalty.125 The Court then reiterated its analysis from
Enmund.126 As an initial matter, the Court stated that imposing the
death penalty for armed robbery is excessive and violates the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments as cruel and unusual punishment.127 It
also found that Enmund’s “tangential” role in the murders paired the
lack of evidence of a culpable mental state weighed in favor of the
death penalty being an improper punishment in that case.128
The Court went on to distinguish the types of cases that Enmund
addressed from the case presented in Tison. Unlike Enmund, Tison
116. See id. at 144.
117. See id.
118. See id. at 144–45.
119. See id.
120. Id. at 145 (citing State v. Tison, 142 Ariz. 454, 456–57 (1984)).
121. See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 145 (1987).
122. See id. at 145–46.
123. See id. at 146.
124. See id. at 146–48.
125. See id. at 148.
126. See id. at 148–58.
127. See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 148 (1987) (quoting Weems v. United States,
217 U.S. 349, 371 (1910)).
128. See id. at 148–49.
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involved accomplices who were at the scene where the murder took
place and played a major role in the crime; however, they did not
clearly kill, attempt to kill, or intend to kill the victims.129 In
explaining the intent issue, the Court agreed with petitioners in that
they did not intend to kill in the traditional sense of the word:
“Traditionally, one intends certain consequences when he desires that
his acts cause those consequences or knows that those consequences
are substantially certain to result from his acts.”130 In the decision
below, the Arizona Supreme Court “attempted to reformulate ‘intent to
kill’ as a species of foreseeability.”131 Specifically, the Arizona
Supreme Court defined intent as follows:
Intend [sic] to kill includes the situation in which the defendant
intended, contemplated, or anticipated that lethal force would or
might be used or that life would or might be taken in accomplishing
132
the underlying felony.

The Court initially acknowledged that this definition was broader
than the definition utilized in Enmund and would render most armed
robbers liable.133 Conversely, the Tison brothers’ behavior was more
culpable than the defendant in Enmund and may render them liable
under state laws that allow intent to be shown through reckless
indifference to human life.134 The main issue addressed in Tison was
whether there is an Eighth Amendment violation when a defendant
who was a major participant in a felony murder and demonstrated
reckless indifference to human life is sentenced to death.135
In making their determination, the Court employed a similar
strategy as utilized in Enmund: they concluded that a majority of
American legislatures allowed the death penalty to be applied to
defendants who played a major role in a felony murder,136 and that
acting with reckless indifference to human life was a sufficiently
culpable mental state.137 Here, the first issue—that the petitioners
played a major role in the crime—was proven as explained above, but
the Court remanded the case so it could be determined whether the
Tison brothers acted with reckless disregard for human life.138

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

See id. at 149–51.
Id. at 150 (quoting W. LaFave & A. Scott, Criminal Law § 28, p. 196 (1972)).
Id. at 150.
Id. (quoting State v. Tison, 142 Ariz., 454, 456 (1984)).
See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 150–51 (1987).
See id. at 151.
See id. at 152.
See id. at 152–55.
See id. at 157–58.
See id. at 158.
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LEGAL PROBLEM: PROPER ANALYSIS OF SIXTH
AMENDMENT CLAIMS FOR ACCOMPLICES TO FELONY
MURDER SENTENCED TO DEATH

The cases discussed in previous sections illustrate how the
Supreme Court would likely rule if a convicted murderer were to make
a Sixth Amendment challenge, as well as how the Court would rule on
an Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment challenge to a death penalty under
a felony murder conviction. However, there is a paucity of case law,
and thus the question has been left open, as to how the Court would
rule if a defendant who was charged as an accomplice or for felony
murder brought a Sixth Amendment challenge.
In attempting to predict how such cases would be decided if
presented before the Court, this Comment will examine the approach
utilized in Ring to address how Tison cases with defendants bringing
Sixth Amendment claims should be addressed.
III.

ANALYSIS: RING & TISON

The relevant aspects of Ring and Tison will be discussed to
highlight the current question of how the Court would assess a case that
presents overlapping issues. Specifically, this Comment analyzes the
issue presented in Ring, a Sixth Amendment claim that a jury should
make a mitigating or aggravating factor determination, if brought by a
defendant who is being charged as an accomplice or for felony murder,
as in Tison.
A. Current Approach to Sixth Amendment Claims: Ring v.
Arizona
In Ring, the Supreme Court held that juries must make findings of
fact that increase the statutory maximum sentence a defendant faces in
order to comply with the Sixth Amendment.139 While this is an
important finding, it only addresses the constitutional rights of a
defendant who actually committed the underlying murder.
In Ring, the defendant was found guilty of felony murder based on
his involvement with a murder that transpired during the course of a
robbery.140 The only way that Ring could be sentenced to death based
on this verdict was if the judge made further findings.141 Specifically,
the judge had to find one aggravating factor and no sufficient
mitigating factors.142 At Ring’s sentencing hearing, the judge found
139.
140.
141.
142.

See supra notes 68–69 and accompanying text.
See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
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that Ring had been the actual killer as well as a major participant based
on testimony from Ring’s co-defendant.143 He also found two
aggravating circumstances associated with Ring’s offense: pecuniary
gain and heinousness of the crime.144 Based on the judge’s findings,
Ring was sentenced to death.145
Ring appealed his sentence, claiming, among other things, that his
sentence violated his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial because
Arizona’s sentencing law entrusts a judge with making factual
determinations that increase a defendant’s maximum penalty.146
The Supreme Court of the United States reversed Ring’s sentence
upon determining that Arizona’s sentencing laws violated the recently
decided Apprendi case.147 In coming to this conclusion, the Court
addressed several conceivable arguments that opponents might assert
and why the opinion it reached is the correct application of Apprendi.148
The first potential argument the Court responded to was whether
“sentencing factors” should be treated differently than “elements of an
offense.”149 It responded to this possibility by restating the rationale
employed in Apprendi: it is the effect that matters, not the label.150 If a
defendant’s statutory maximum penalty is increased by a fact found by
the judge, then this violates the Sixth Amendment.151
The Court also found that the argument that defendants facing the
death penalty should be given less constitutional protection than other
criminal defendants is without merit: “Arizona presents ‘no specific
reason for excepting capital defendants from the constitutional
protections . . . extended to defendants generally, and none is readily
apparent.’”152
Finally, the Court dismissed the argument that judges are better
able to make these kinds of fact-finding determinations.153 The Court
stated that this was not evident154 and also emphasized that juries are
trusted with making such aggravating and mitigating factor

143. See supra notes 52 and accompanying text.
144. See supra notes 54–55 and accompanying text.
145. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
146. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
147. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 65–68 and accompanying text; see also Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S.
584, 604–09 (2002).
149. See supra notes 67 and accompanying text.
150. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
151. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
152. Ring, 536 U.S. at 606 (quoting Justice O’Connor’s dissent in Apprendi, 530 U.S. at
539); see also supra note 69 and accompanying text.
153. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
154. See Ring, 536 U.S. at 607.
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determinations in a majority of other jurisdictions.155 It also drew upon
the rationale that criminal defendants have a constitutional right to a
jury trial if they so desire:
The guarantees of jury trial in the Federal and State Constitutions
reflect a profound judgment about the way in which law should be
enforced and justice administered . . . If the defendant preferred the
common-sense judgment of a jury to the more tutored but perhaps
156
less sympathetic reaction of the single judge, he was to have it.

After dismissing all of the potential arguments described above,
the Court concluded that “[c]apital defendants, no less than noncapital
defendants . . . are entitled to a jury determination of any fact on which
the legislature conditions an increase in their maximum
punishment.”157 However, as previously stated, the Ring decision was
limited in scope as to applying to cases where the defendant was found
to be the actual killer.
B. Death Penalty Imposed on Non-Murderers: Tison v. Arizona
In Tison, the Supreme Court ruled on the constitutionality of
Arizona’s felony murder law.158 The defendants and petitioners,
Raymond and Ricky Tison, helped two convicted murderers, their
father and his cellmate, escape from prison159 and subsequently were
involved with a carjacking that resulted in the murder of four
individuals.160 Although their father and his cellmate were the ones
who actually committed the four murders,161 Raymond and Ricky were
also convicted of the four murders based on Arizona’s accomplice
liability and felony murder statutes.162 The brothers were sentenced to
death.163
The Tison brothers appealed their death sentences numerous
times164 and eventually the Supreme Court reviewed their case to see if
it was consistent with Enmund, a recently decided Supreme Court
case.165 Ultimately the Court remanded the Tison brothers’ cases so the
defendants’ levels of culpability could be determined.166

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

See id. at 607–08.
Id. at 609 (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155–56 (1968)).
Id. at 589.
See supra notes 92–93 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 95–96 and accompanying text.
See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 99–100 and accompanying text.
See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 110–113 and accompanying text.
See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
See supra note 115 and accompanying text.

218

DEATH PENALTY FOR FELONY MURDER

[Vol:57

Tison is relevant to this Comment because the case demonstrates
that it remains constitutional to sentence an individual to death who did
not commit the underlying murder at issue.167 Tison is also important
because it illustrates the analysis utilized by the Court in reaching their
opinion regarding other constitutional amendments.168
Tison holds that it is constitutional to sentence an individual to
death who did not actually commit murder when certain factors are
met.169 Specifically, the defendant must have played a substantial role
in the crime and their level of culpability must meet a certain level:
“substantial participation in a violent felony under circumstances likely
to result in the loss of innocent human life may justify the death
penalty even absent an “intent to kill.”170 The Court listed a number of
scenarios where they did not overturn such types of death penalty
convictions.171
The Court expanded upon the notion that the level of culpability a
defendant had in the crime plays an important role in sentencing:
A critical facet of the individualized determination of culpability
required in capital cases is the mental state with which the
defendant commits the crime. Deeply ingrained in our legal
tradition is the idea that the more purposeful is the criminal
conduct, the more serious is the offense, and, therefore, the more
172
severely it ought to be punished.

The Court concluded that in addition to “intending to kill,” “the
reckless disregard for human life implicit in knowingly engaging in
criminal activities known to carry a grave risk of death represents a
highly culpable mental state”173 and suggested that this level of

167. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 136–138 and accompanying text.
169. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
170. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 154 (1987) (citing Clines v. State, 280 Ark. 77, 84
(1983)).
171. See id. at 154–55 (citing Clines, 280 Ark. at 84 (armed, forced entry, nighttime
robbery of private dwelling known to be occupied plus evidence that killing contemplated),
cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1051 (1984); Deputy v. State, 500 A. 2d 581, 599–600 (Del. 1985)
(defendant present at scene; robbed victims; conflicting evidence as to participation in
killing), cert. pending, No. 85-6272; Ruffin v. State, 420 So. 2d 591, 594 (Fla. 1982)
(defendant present, assisted codefendant in kidnaping, raped victim, made no effort to
interfere with codefendant’s killing victim and continued on the joint venture); People v.
Davis, 95 Ill. 2d 1, 52, (defendant present at the scene and had participated in other crimes
with Holman, the triggerman, during which Holman had killed under similar circumstances),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1001 (1983); Selvage v. State, 680 S. W. 2d 17, 22 (Tex. Cr. App.
1984) (participant in jewelry store robbery during the course of which a security guard was
killed; no evidence that defendant himself shot the guard but he did fire a weapon at those
who gave chase); see also Allen v. State, 253 Ga. 390, 395, n. 3 (1984)).
172. Id. at 156.
173. Id. at 157.
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culpability might be enough to warrant a death sentence.174
In coming to the above determinations, the Court employed a
similar strategy as that utilized in Enmund.175 It looked at numerous
state laws on felony murder and accomplice liability.176 It also looked
at overall trends and the majority view on this subject.177 Because a
majority of the states allow defendants convicted of felony murder to
be sentenced to death (under various standards and upon finding
differing levels of culpability)178 the Court determined that the death
penalty could be instituted upon defendants who played a major role
and exhibited a reckless disregard for human life.179
Tison presented the type of defendant that is the focus of this
Comment in terms of assessing whether the Sixth Amendment should
apply. In other words, whether juries need to make aggravating and
mitigating factor determinations when it increases the maximum
statutory penalty to death for defendants who were convicted under
accomplice or felony murder laws.
IV.

PROPOSAL

If the Supreme Court was presented with and granted certiorari to
a case similar to Tison v. Arizona, with the exception that the defendant
brought a Sixth Amendment claim, the Supreme Court should extend
the holding of Ring v. Arizona to these types of cases.
In light of the Supreme Court’s holding in Ring that the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution requires a jury to make
findings of fact when a defendant’s maximum statutory punishment is
increased by finding aggravating and a lack of substantial mitigating
factors,180 the Court should find that this logic also applies to Tisontype cases.
All of the Court’s reasons for their holding in Ring are also
applicable to defendants who have been convicted as accomplices or
under felony murder laws and face the death penalty. As previously
discussed by the Supreme Court in Ring, the protection of a jury trial
extends to all criminal defendants.181 Ring specifically held that it
would not make sense for this right and protection not to apply to death

174. See id. at 157–58.
175. See id. at 152-55; see also supra notes 138–39 and accompanying text.
176. Tison, v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 152–54 (1987); see also supra notes 138–39 and
accompanying text.
177. See Tison, 481 U.S. at 152–54.;
178. See id.
179. See id. at 158.
180. See supra notes 71–72 and accompanying text.
181. See supra note 69.

220

DEATH PENALTY FOR FELONY MURDER

[Vol:57

penalty cases.182 Because the Court has held that it is constitutional for
accomplices and those convicted of felony murder to be sentenced to
death under certain circumstances they should also be given the same
constitutional protections.
The Court also stated in Ring that it is not clear that judges are
better situated than a jury to make findings of fact regarding
aggravating and mitigating factors.183 This conclusion does not differ
for judges or juries presiding over cases involving fact finding where
the defendant is convicted under accomplice or felony murder laws.
Additionally, the Court found that many states rely on juries to make
such findings.184 It follows that juries would similarly be able to make
such determinations involving individuals who did not commit the
murder at issue. Finally, they stressed that criminal defendants have
the right to decide if they want a judge or jury to make the factual
findings in their case.185 This should not change simply because the
defendant did not actually commit the underlying murder.
Because in Ring the defendant was ultimately found to have
committed the murder that made him eligible for the death penalty,186
the Court did not specifically address what standard applies to
accomplices or felony murder convicts. However, the rationale that
was utilized in Ring, that all defendants should be entitled to have the
ability to have a jury make findings of fact that could increase the
statutory maximum penalty,187 logically extends to defendants
convicted as accomplices or for felony murder who would similarly
face the death penalty upon such factual findings.
When an individual convicted as an accomplice or for felony
murder is being sentenced and the death penalty is at issue, a jury
should be required to make findings of fact in terms of aggravating and
mitigating circumstances, or lack thereof, that would make the
defendant eligible for the death penalty. In Tison the defendants’
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were at issue,188 but it would
make little sense for these individuals not to similarly be given the
protections of the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury trial.
CONCLUSION
The death penalty is a provocative issue that has spurred debate in
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 71–72 and accompanying text.
See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 152 (1987).
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the United States since its inception.189 Because the death penalty has
yet to be deemed unconstitutional by the Supreme Court,190 it remains
vital to continue these debates as well as postulate how the Supreme
Court might analyze various cases involving the death penalty in an
upcoming term.
The Supreme Court has changed its stance on the constitutionality
of various aspects of the death penalty over the years.191 Overall, the
Court has limited the use of the death penalty by making various
decisions that narrowed the scope in terms of who this form of
punishment may be applied to,192 as well as what types of crimes are
eligible for this sentence.193
The Supreme Court has also changed its view on what the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution means in terms of right
to a jury trial.194 Originally, the Court held that this right only extends
to “elements of an offense” and not “sentencing factors.”195 However,
in a subsequent case, Ring v. Arizona, the Court determined that the
Sixth Amendment right is not limited by the label that the legislature
uses, in terms of “elements of an offense” or “sentencing factors,”196
but extends to whenever there is a fact that would mean a defendant
faces a punishment that exceeds the statutory maximum.197
The Supreme Court also held in Tison v. Arizona that it is
constitutional to sentence a defendant to death who did not commit
murder but was convicted as an accomplice or found guilty of felony
murder under certain circumstances.198 Specifically, the defendant had
to be a major participant in the felony199 that a murder occurred during
the course of, and the defendant also had to either intend for the death
to occur or exhibit a reckless disregard for human life.200
Cases like Tison, but that involve defendants bringing Sixth
Amendment right to jury trial claims, should be decided similarly to
Ring. That is, accomplices or individuals convicted for felony murder
have the same constitutional rights as other criminal defendants and are
entitled to have a jury determine findings of fact that may increase the

189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
See supra Parts IA–IB and accompanying text.
See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 26–72 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 40–42 and accompanying text.
See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 138–39 and accompanying text.
See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
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statutory maximum penalty they face including aggravating and
mitigating factors. If a criminal defendant chooses to have a jury trial a
jury should be entrusted with making fact finding determinations
surrounding aggravating and mitigating circumstances when assessing
whether the death penalty should be applied to accomplices or those
convicted for felony murder who are major participants in the crime
and who display a reckless disregard for human life.

